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Abstract 
This paper studies the contested nature of new modes of governance two decades after the 
“participatory paradigm” was announced at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. With a focus on private 
multi-stakeholder initiatives, it conducts an in-depth analysis of business-civil society interaction in 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, a scheme created to define an internationally accepted 
standard for biofuel production. Through its highly inclusive and transparent design, the roundtable 
provides what could be called ideal institutional scope conditions for participatory governance. 
However, falling far short of the participatory ideal of open-minded and consensus-oriented 
deliberation, the analysis uncovers how stakeholder interaction in the roundtable frequently collapsed 
into power struggles and interest group bargaining. Inquiring into the causes of this deliberation 
failure, the article identifies the high level of politicization in the biofuels arena as well as the 
background role of the state as the main explanatory factors. 
Keywords 
Private governance, sustainability, deliberation, institutional design, biofuels, democratic theory. 
   
  
 
 1 
Introduction  
Private multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are a new mode of global sustainability governance. Being 
developed through the collaboration and contestation between business and civil society actors, these 
arrangements set standards for sustainable production and often rely on market mechanisms 
(certification) for their implementation. Today, these arrangements operate in many industry sectors, 
where they are an important source of social and environmental regulation for the world’s forests, 
factories, farms, and mines.  
MSIs are part and parcel of what Bäckstrand et al. and others refer to as the “participatory 
paradigm” or “deliberative turn” in global sustainability politics (Bäckstrand, Khan, Kronsell, & 
Lövbrand, 2010; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Bexel & Mörth, 2010; Dingwerth, 2007; Risse, 2004). 
The background to this are new developments in democratic theory (Dryzek, 2000; Eckersley, 1992; 
Lövbrand & Khan, 2010; Smith, 2003) and international policy initiatives which see broad public 
participation in decision-making as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving sustainable development 
goals (United Nations, 1992). MSIs try to approximate the deliberative ideal through the multi-
stakeholder structure of their decision-making and standard-setting bodies, the use consultation 
mechanisms, and procedural transparency. Because of this, they have been widely praised for their 
potential to reduce the democratic deficit of global governance institutions (Cashore, Auld, & 
Newsom, 2004; Dingwerth, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2008; Schaller, 2007). 
However, the deliberative capacity of MSIs remains contested, as scholars criticize the dominance 
of established stakeholder groups, a focus on selective topics and discourses, as well as power 
asymmetries between participants (Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2011; 
Schouten, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2012). Contributing to a critical re-examination of multi-stakeholder 
sustainability governance, this paper conducts an in-depth analysis of business-civil society interaction 
in the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB).
1
 Established in 2006 to define a global standard for 
sustainable biofuel production, the RSB is widely regarded as an exemplary and highly inclusive and 
transparent initiative (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). From an institutional design perspective, 
the scheme’s open and experimentalist approach makes it to what could be called a most-likely case of 
meaningful deliberative governance. However, the in-depth analysis of stakeholder interaction in the 
RSB reveals that with regard to important decisions and over extended periods of time bargaining, and 
not deliberation, dominated the internal debate. Business actors and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) struggled fiercely over the balance of power in the fledgling organization and the content of 
the regulatory outcome, leading many stakeholders to effectively abandon the initiative.  
Inquiring into the causes of this deliberation failure, this paper identifies a high level of 
politicization as well as the background role of the state as the main contributing factors. Regarding 
the former, it is uncovered how deep-seated divisions and ideologically charged conflicts limited the 
opportunity structure for meaningful deliberative governance in the biofuels arena. Furthermore, it is 
shown how (in form of the EU Commission) state actors endorsed a non-participatory model of 
private sustainability regulation in this policy area, thus reducing the pressure on firms and their 
industry associations to engage in difficult interactions with critical NGOs.  
The Participatory Paradigm in Theory and Practice  
Since the 1990s, democratic theory has taken a strong deliberative turn (Bohman & Regh, 1997; 
Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998). According to Dryzek (2000: 1), this “turn represents a renewed concern 
with the authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than 
                                                     
1
 The RSB recently changed its name to Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials.  
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symbolic, and engaged by competent citizens”. In light of this, deliberative thinkers stress the 
importance of process over the idea of formal accountability which permeates liberal democratic 
theory. In essence, the deliberative argument goes that true democratic legitimacy requires that all 
those affected by a rule have to have the opportunity to actively and equally participate in the rule-
making process. As noted by Dryzek (2000: 1-8), this emphasis on deliberation is not an entirely new 
phenomenon. Elements of deliberative democracy can be found in the polis of ancient Greece and in 
the works of Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill. However, prior to the 1990s the term deliberative 
democracy was rarely used. It was invented by Joseph Bessette and given impetus by Bernand Manin 
and Joshua Cohen. The concept then gained in importance and became the focal point of democratic 
theory when Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls identified themselves as deliberative democrats in their 
major works.  
Smith (2003: 54) traces the deliberative turn in democratic theory back to a widespread 
dissatisfaction with the dominating liberal model of democracy. As mentioned above, liberal 
democracy is based on a principal-agent form of accountability. In this model, individual preferences 
are aggregated through an electoral mechanism. In this way, a collective choice is made and delegated 
to an agent (i.e. government) for execution. The model’s legitimacy ultimately rests on the right and 
ability of the principal to hold its agents to account, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities and to impose sanctions if these responsibilities have not been met (Grant & Keohane, 
2005: 29). Smith notes that although periodic elections have a disciplining effect on the elected to act 
in the voters’ interests, the mandates that representatives enjoy typically extend over several years in 
which the electorate has little influence on the decision-making process. He and others criticize that 
this has given rise to political disillusionment and a growing distance between citizens and their 
representatives.  
It is this dissatisfaction with the liberal conception of democracy which has renewed interest in the 
process of political decision-making. It is believed that “getting the process right” can help to 
revitalize and restore democratic legitimacy (Bohman & Regh, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998). 
Strongly influenced by Habermas’ theory of communicative action, the deliberative approach 
essentially boils down to two procedural criteria: inclusiveness and unconstrained dialogue (Lövbrand 
& Khan, 2010; Smith, 2003). Inclusiveness requires that all those affected by a rule need to be given 
the opportunity to participate in the rule-making process. The second criterion necessitates that the 
only authority is that of a good argument. In other words, the deliberative process needs to be free 
from domination, manipulation, and strategic behavior. The theory goes that if these criteria are met 
meaningful deliberation, and thus democratic legitimacy, becomes possible. 
Because of its focus on process instead of formal accountability, deliberative democracy has been 
proposed as a model to increase the legitimacy of global governance institutions. The background to 
this is that at the global level no clearly defined demos or self-governing community exists. Preference 
aggregation and principal-agent accountability are therefore not well suited for the reality of 
transnational rule-making with its multitude of actors and diffuse authority. Therefore, many scholars 
agree that deliberative democracy is an attractive model not only for revitalizing democratic 
legitimacy at the national level but also for the organization of good governance beyond the nation 
state (Dingwerth, 2007: 21; Dryzek, 2000: 116). 
Ideas about participatory governance are now a constitutive element of global sustainability 
politics. This is evidenced by the fact that procedural principles such as stakeholder consultation, 
inclusiveness, and transparency have been given emphasis in central policy documents in this area. 
One important example is Agenda 21. As one of the main policy outputs of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Agenda 21 defined an 
action plan for the United Nations, other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and individual 
governments to advance social and environmental sustainability in four key areas: social and 
economic sustainability; conservation and management of resources for development; strengthening 
the role of major groups; and means of implementation. With regard to implementation, the policy 
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documents states that “[o]ne of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable 
development is broad public participation in decision-making” (United Nations, 1992). In a similar 
vein, the United Nations’ Commission on Global Governance in its final report called for “more 
inclusive and more participatory” mechanisms of global governance (Commission on Global 
Governance, 1995: 5). In practice, these calls for participation and inclusiveness have given rise to a 
large variety of ‘new modes of governance’. In an attempt to map the emerging governance 
infrastructure, Kronsell and Bäckstrand (2010) identify citizen juries at the national level, the inclusion 
of civil society actors in intergovernmental policy-making processes, public-private partnerships, as 
well as private multi-stakeholder arrangements (the subject of this paper) as forming part of the 
deliberative turn or participatory paradigm in global sustainability politics.  
Organizing Deliberative Private Governance  
In the area of private governance, MSIs have become an important source of global sustainability 
regulation in recent years. In form of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the multi-stakeholder 
model first emerged in the forestry sector in the early 1990s and from there spread rapidly and widely 
in the global economy. Today, multi-stakeholder schemes operate in many industry sectors, ranging 
from garment manufacturing and diamond mining to aquaculture production and soybean farming (see 
Table 1). Involving stakeholders from across these industries, they set standards for socially and 
environmentally sustainable production and often rely on market-based mechanisms for their 
implementation. 
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Table 1: Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives for Sustainability  
Sector Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Main Focus Year of 
Foundation 
Forestry Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)  
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC) 
Environment 
Environment 
1993 
1999 
Apparel Fair Labor Association (FLA) 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) 
Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) 
Rugmark International/Good Weave (GW) 
Social Accountability International (SAI) 
Labor rights 
Labor rights 
Labor rights 
Labor rights 
Labor rights 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1995 
1997 
Agriculture  
 
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) 
Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI) /Bonsucro  
Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO) 
Flower Label Programme (FLP) 
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB) 
International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) 
International Sustainability and Carbon 
Certification (ISCC) 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS) 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
Sustainable Rice Platform (SRP) 
Utz Certifed 
Common Code for the Coffee Community 
Association (4C)  
Environment 
Environment 
Fair trade  
Labor rights 
Environment  
 
Labor rights 
Environment 
 
Environment  
Environment 
Environment 
Environment 
Environment 
Environment 
2009 
2009 
1997 
1999 
2012 
 
2002 
2010 
 
2006 
2009 
2004 
in formation 
2002 
2006 
Fishery Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
Marine Aquarium Council (MAC) 
Environment 
Environment  
Environment 
2009 
1999 
1998 
Mining Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance 
(IRMA) 
Corruption  
 
Illicit trade  
 
Environment 
2002 
 
2003 
 
in formation  
Tourism Global Sustainable Tourism Council (GSTC) Environment 2008 
Energy Equitable Origin (EQ) 
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol 
(HSAP) 
Environment 
Environment  
2009 
2013 
MSIs seek to approximate the deliberative ideal through participatory elements and procedural 
transparency. These institutional design features directly follow from the two core principles of 
deliberative democratic theory: inclusiveness and unconstrained dialogue (Lövbrand & Khan, 2010; 
Smith, 2003). In this regard, multi-stakeholder boards, observer councils, public outreach meetings, 
and other consultation mechanisms are intended to ensure that a wide range of stakeholders is included 
in their decision-making and standard-setting activities. Although transparency is not equivalent to 
unconstrained dialogue, it is widely regarded as a key element of good governance. According to Esty 
(2007: 525), seeing the decision-makers in action and observing who has influenced a decision is 
essential to establishing a sense of fairness, rationality, and neutrality. Also, it exposes the decision-
making process to public scrutiny and thus discourages rent-seeking and other forms of self-serving 
behavior. Against this background, it has been argued that MSIs “frequently base their decisions on 
sincere and meaningful deliberation among participants” (Dingwerth, 2007: 9). In a similar vein, 
Gulbrandsen (2008) and Cashore et al. (2004: 298) refer to them as a “good governance model” and 
“one of the most innovative and startling institutional designs of the past 50 years”.  
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Others, on the other hand, contend that real-world MSIs often fall far short of the deliberative ideal. 
For example, in their study of the deliberative capacity of two agricultural commodity roundtables, 
Schouten et al. (2012) find that they include only a limited variety of pragmatic and technical 
discourses, whilst excluding local knowledge and ideological or emotional styles of communication. A 
similar criticism has been made by Cheyns (2011), who concludes that small-scale farmers and 
communities from the global south are often excluded from these arrangements. 
Contributing to a critical re-examination of multi-stakeholder sustainability governance, this article 
conducts an in-depth analysis of stakeholder interaction in the RSB. As mentioned in the introduction 
to this chapter, the RSB is widely regarded as an exemplary and highly inclusive and transparent 
private governance institution (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). The scheme involves a broad 
range of stakeholders in its governance and standard-setting activities and like few other initiatives has 
made its internal decision-making process transparent to the public (see below for a more detailed 
description). Therefore, from an institutional design perspective, the RSB can be considered a most-
likely case for meaningful private deliberation to occur. In the words of Risse and Kleine (2010), it 
provides ideal “institutional scope conditions”. However, empirical studies have shown that instances 
of meaningful deliberation remain extremely rare in political reality. There is a high risk that so-called 
deliberative governance arrangements collapse into competitive interest group politics, with strategic 
bargaining being the dominant mode of interaction rather than deliberation or arguing (Risse, 2004). 
In order to examine the relationship between institutional design and the quality of deliberative 
practices in the RSB, firstly, a definition of deliberation is needed. According to Risse (2000), 
deliberation is a communicative process in which actors seek to reach a reasoned consensus about an 
issue, with the objective to define behavioral principles and norms. The dominant mode of interaction 
is that of arguing which has to be distinguished from bargaining. When actors bargain they act 
instrumentally. They strategically exchange demands, promises, and threats, with the objective of 
satisfying given preferences as much as possible. In contrast, “where argumentative rationality 
prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or to satisfy their given interests and preferences, but to 
challenge and to justify the validity claims inherent in them – and they are prepared to change their 
views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument” (Risse, 2000: 7). Secondly, to 
begin the empirical analysis, some indicators are needed in order to assess whether the RSB 
constitutes an arena of meaningful deliberation or whether it is primarily a site of strategic behavior 
and bargaining. Table 2 summarizes the major differences between deliberation and bargaining and 
offers some clues how to distinguish which mode of interaction dominates in a given decision-making 
sequence (cf. Risse, 2000, 2004; Risse & Kleine, 2010).  
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Table 2: Deliberation vs. Bargaining 
 Deliberation  Bargaining  
Goal The goal of deliberation is to reach an 
argumentative consensus.  
The goal of bargaining is to maximize given 
preferences.  
Decision-
making 
process 
 
 
In deliberation mode, actors challenge 
the validity claims inherent in any 
causal and normative statement. They 
are eager to learn more about a problem 
or situation as they try to define and 
justify behavioral principles and norms. 
The nature of deliberative processes is 
consensus-oriented and open-minded. 
Power relationships recede into the 
background and the better argument 
carries the day (argumentative 
rationality). This implies that 
deliberators are willing to change their 
preferences and normative beliefs. 
In bargaining mode, actors communicate 
primarily to exchange information about 
preferences, propose deals and make threats. 
The nature of bargaining is confrontational. 
Actors try to maximize their given 
preferences as much as possible, often to the 
disadvantage of others. The distribution of 
bargaining power plays an important role in 
these situations. Essentially, it determines 
whose preferences prevail. 
 
 
 
Possible 
observable 
outcome 
 
The outcome of a deliberative process 
is an argumentative consensus. 
Typically, this consensus reflects a 
higher principle or concept that during 
the deliberative process and in careful 
consideration of possible alternatives 
was identified as being superior. An 
important indicator for meaningful 
deliberation is if the outcome reflects 
the position of weak actors.  
The outcomes of bargaining processes reflect 
the preferences of the most powerful actor – 
often, side payments are made. If no actor is 
able to dominate the bargaining process, then 
the outcome reflects the lowest common 
denominator. Bargaining breaks down, if no 
‘zone of possible agreement’ exists.  
In the following section, these indicators will be used to examine the nature of stakeholder interaction 
in the RSB. The case study draws on detailed meeting minutes of the RSB’s Steering Board and 
stakeholder chambers, the scheme’s central decision-making bodies. It is here where binding decisions 
about the organization’s structure, strategy, and standards are made. For the empirical analysis, 
meeting minutes are available for the period of 2006-2012. Using Atlas.ti, an open coding software for 
qualitative data, key decision-making sequences were identified and subsequently analyzed as to 
whether they show signs of meaningful deliberation or whether bargaining was the dominant mode of 
stakeholder interaction. The information from the meeting minutes was then triangulated with original 
interview data. To this end, 18 interviews with key stakeholders and observers of the RSB process 
were conducted during 2011 and 2012.  
The RSB: A Site of Meaningful Deliberation?  
The biofuel sector is a relatively young global industry. Although biofuel production has existed in 
countries like Brazil and the USA since the 1970s, the emergence of a global biofuel supply chain and 
market is a rather recent phenomenon. Over the last decade biofuel production, consumption, and 
trade have expanded significantly as major industrialized countries around the world have adopted 
blending mandates and quotas for biofuels (Global Renewable Fuels Alliance, website).  
One important example is the European Union Renewable Energy Directive (EU RED). Enacted in 
2009, the EU RED established a blending mandate for biofuels in the transport sector of 10 percent to 
be achieved by 2020 (European Union, 2009). This and supporting policies at the member state level 
created one of the world’s largest biofuel markets with an estimated volume of currently 14 billion 
liters or 4.65 percent of total transport fuels (USDA, 2013). As a result of the EU RED and similar 
policies elsewhere, world biofuel production increased six-fold during 2000-2011, from 315 to 1898 
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thousand barrels per day (U.S. Energy Information Administration, website). Also, the global trade in 
biofuels is set to increase strongly, from 4.5 billion liters annually in the previous decade to 12 billion 
liters by 2021 (OECD-FAO, 2012: 95).  
This rapid expansion of biofuel production, trade, and consumption has contributed to a surge in 
global demand for food commodities, and the Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that this 
trend will continue in the future (see Table 3).  
Table 3: World Use of Food Crops for Biofuel Production 
Crop  Unit 2005 2030 
Cereals  Million tons  65  182  
Percent of total use 3.2 6.7 
Vegetable oils Million tons 7  29 
Percent of total use 4.8 12.6 
Sugarcane 
 
Million tons 28  81  
Percent of total use 15.1 27.4 
 
Source: FAO 2012  
This development has triggered much debate about the sustainability of industrial biofuel production. 
One of the major issues raised is the carbon intensity of biofuels. Often, biofuels are promoted as a 
means to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and thus to reach climate change reduction targets. 
But official figures often do not consider emissions emanating from direct and indirect land use 
change. Direct land use change occurs when previously uncultivated land is converted to the 
production of energy crops. One the other hand, indirect land use change is a process in which biofuels 
displace other agricultural activities to previously uncultivated areas. Direct and indirect land use 
changes are problematic as they can result in an overall negative GHG balance of biofuels. This is the 
case if, for example, forests, peatlands, or wetlands are cultivated (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
2011, pp. 32-33).  
Also, the social impact of biofuels has become a highly contentious issue. Besides poor labor 
standards in producer countries and problems with land grabbing, it was particularly the global food 
crisis of 2007/2008 which sparked much controversy about biofuels. The debate was further fuelled by 
the release of the Gallagher Review in July 2008. Commissioned by the British Secretary of State for 
Transport, the review concluded that without safeguards biofuel policies in the EU and elsewhere will: 
(1) reduce biodiversity; (2) may cause GHG emissions rather than savings; and (3) that increasing 
demand for biofuels contributes to rising prices for some food commodities such as oil seeds 
(Renewable Fuels Agency, 2008, pp. 7-15). 
To address this situation, several private governance arrangements were created to mitigate the 
social and environmental impact of biofuel production. The growth of private governance in the 
biofuel sector was further spurred by the EU’s decision to rely on private certification schemes for 
implementing the EU RED. In addition to a blending mandate, the EU RED included a mandatory 
sustainability scheme which all biofuels produced or imported to the EU must meet. The emerging 
system of private governance in the biofuel sector includes firm-level self-regulation, industry-level 
initiatives, and MSIs. These arrangements are now a major source of environmental and social 
regulation in the industry (Schleifer, 2013). 
Adopting a Good Governance Model  
The idea of launching a roundtable discussion on sustainable biofuel production was first invoked at a 
conference organized by the German NGO Forum and the UN Environmental Programme in Bonn in 
October 2006. A month later, a group of approximately twenty stakeholders from industry, civil 
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society, academia and government met to further explore the issue at a workshop hosted by the École 
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL). The workshop served as a forum to analyze the social 
and environmental impact of commercial biofuel production and to investigate “the potential for 
developing an internationally accepted and implementable standards for sustainable biofuels” (RSB, 
2006). A major outcome of the meeting was the decision to create a Founding Steering Board and a 
small Secretariat based at the EPFL Energy Center. From the very beginning, the initiators of the RSB 
tried to maintain a high level of inclusiveness and transparency. In this regard, the Founding Steering 
Board (FSB) included the industry’s major stakeholder groups and detailed meeting minutes were 
made publicly available on the RSB’s website (see Figure 1) (RSB, website). 
Figure 1: Composition of the RSB Founding Steering Board (seats/stakeholder group) 
 
Based on RSB 2011 
Standard-setting in the RSB took place in four working groups (WGs) on environmental impacts, 
social impacts, greenhouse gases and implementation. Participation in the WGs was free of charge and 
open to all interested parties. Decisions over draft principles and criteria were reached by consensus or 
simple majority in the case of deadlock. Regarding the composition of the WGs, there was no formal 
balance between sectors or regions. However, the secretariat and working group coordinators aimed to 
maintain an overall balance in order to prevent single interest groups from capturing the process 
(interview with a member of the RSB Secretariat). Overall, some 280 organizations and individuals 
registered with the working groups (RSB, 2007a, 2007c). Communication between the members of the 
WGs took place via teleconferences and through a so-called Bioenergy Wiki. Openly accessible to the 
public, the Bioenergy Wiki is a website which contains detailed documentation of the standard-setting 
process of the RSB, including meeting minutes of the WGs as well as background documents 
(Bioenergy Wiki, website).  
Taken together, the process leading to Version Zero of the RSB standard involved more than 50 
working group teleconferences and four stakeholder outreach meetings in Brazil, China, South Africa 
and India (RSB, 2008a). In August 2008, the 12 principles and related criteria of Version Zero were 
formally adopted by the Founding Steering Board. Following the guidelines of the International Social 
and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance, an association defining standards 
of good practices for private standard-setting organizations, the standard was then made available for 
public scrutiny and comments (RSB, 2009). During the consultations, the RSB Secretariat organized 
15 stakeholder outreach meetings around the globe and received comments via phone and its website. 
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Furthermore, the Kluyver Centre for Genomics of Industrial Fermentation in Delft, Netherlands was 
commissioned to conduct an expert workshop to review the RSB standard (Kluyver Centre, 2008). 
Documentation about stakeholder engagement during this period provides evidence that nearly 900 
individuals and organizations from over 40 countries participated in the feedback process to improve 
Version Zero of the RSB standard (RSB, 2009). 
In January 2009, the RSB was launched as a membership organization with a formal governance 
structure. The FSB and the four WGs were dissolved and replaced by a formally elected Steering 
Board (SB) and a corresponding chamber system. Later, three expert groups on genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), GHGs, and indirect impacts were formed to work out the technical details of the 
RSB Principles and Criteria. Initially, the chamber system consisted of eleven stakeholder chambers. 
The private sector was represented by four chambers and environmental and social groups by a further 
six. The eleventh chamber, comprising government agencies, IGOs, consultancy firms, academics and 
certification agencies, was set up as a non-voting chamber. Early in 2010, a decision was made to 
reduce the number of stakeholder chambers from eleven to seven. The revised chamber structure 
consisted of three industry chambers, three civil society chambers, and the former Chamber 11 as a 
non-voting chamber (see Figure 2) (RSB, 2011d). 
Figure 2: Organizational Chart of the RSB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the formal organization, the decision-making process has two stages. In a first stage, a decision 
about an agenda item is reached at the chamber-level. Chamber meetings are held via teleconference 
or in person and have a quorum if at least 25 percent of its membership or three members, whichever 
is highest, participate. Chambers reach their decisions by consensus. However, if in a third consecutive 
meeting no consensus can be reached regarding a particular agenda item, then decisions may be 
reached by a vote of two-thirds of the members present (RSB, 2010h). In a second stage, the agenda 
item is passed on to the SB. The composition of the SB follows from the chamber structure. Each 
chamber elects up to two representatives, known as co-chairs, who represent the chamber at the SB-
level. Like the FSB before it, the SB meets several times a year via teleconference or in person and is 
RSB Stakeholder Chambers 
Eleven Chamber System (January 2009 – April 2010) 
1. Farmers and growers of biofuel feedstocks  
2. Industrial biofuel producers  
3. Retailers/blenders and the transportation industry  
4. Banks/investors  
5. Rights-based NGOs 
6. Rural development and food security organizations  
7. Environment and conservation organizations  
8. Climate change and policy organizations  
9. Trade unions  
10. Smallholder and indigenous peoples’ organizations  
11. IGOs, governments, standard-setters, specialist advisory 
agencies, certification agencies, and consultants (non-voting 
chamber) 
 
Seven Chamber System (since April 2010) 
1. Farmers and growers of biofuel feedstocks  
2. Industrial biofuel producers  
3. Retailers/blenders, the transportation industry, 
banks/investors  
4. Rights-based NGOs and trade unions  
5. Rural development, food security organizations, 
smallholder farmer organizations, indigenous 
peoples' organizations and community-based civil 
society organizations  
6. Environmental NGOs, climate change and policy 
organizations 
7. IGOs, governments, standard-setters, specialist advisory 
agencies, certification agencies, and consultants (non-voting 
chamber)  
 
RSB Steering Board 
Primary decision-making body, comprises 
up to two representatives from each 
chamber + RSB Executive Secretary 
RSB Secretariat 
-  Based at EPFL Energy  
    Center 
- Day-to-day management 
   
  
 Expert Groups  
- GMOs  
- GHGs 
- Indirect impacts 
 
  
Philip Schleifer 
10 
deemed to be quorate if at least 60 percent of its members are present. Similar to decision-making in 
the chambers, the SB strives to reach consensus. However, in the case of deadlock (i.e. no consensus 
in a third consecutive meeting) a decision can be reached by a vote of two-thirds of the voting 
members present (RSB, 2010h). 
Overall, the RSB can be characterized as a private governance institution with a strongly 
participatory approach. The organization’s primary decision-making and standard-setting bodies 
maintain a careful balance between industry and civil society stakeholders as well as organizations 
from developed and developing countries. Furthermore, through its high level of procedural 
transparency the scheme enables public scrutiny, thus creating favorable conditions for unconstrained 
dialogue between its various constituencies.  
Analyzing the Nature of Stakeholder Interaction in the RSB  
Using the ideal-typical distinction between deliberation and bargaining as a baseline for comparison, 
this section now examines the hypothesized link between institutional scope conditions and the quality 
of deliberative practices in the RSB. To reiterate, in deliberation mode decisions are reached through 
consensus-oriented arguing. Principally, stakeholders are willing to change their previously held 
beliefs and preferences in light of the better argument, whilst power relationships recede into the 
background. In contrast, in bargaining situations communication primarily serves the purpose to 
exchange information about preferences, to propose deals, and to make threats. The ultimate goal is to 
maximize given preferences as much as possible.  
The in-depth analysis of the meeting minutes and interview material revealed that with regard to 
important decisions and over extended periods of time bargaining, and not deliberation, dominated the 
internal debate in the RSB. Instead of seeking an argumentative consensus, industry and civil society 
actors tried to maximize their material and normative preferences as well as their influence over the 
institution. In order to illustrate this point, this section describes two episodes from the recent history 
of the RSB. The first episode shows how industry and civil society stakeholders struggled fiercely 
over the balance of power in the RSB. Thus, in violation of the deliberative ideal, power relationships 
did not recede into the background, but dominated the internal debate in the RSB over an extended 
period of time. The second episode documents how producer groups clashed with NGOs over the 
content of the standard and the design of the certification system. During the negotiations, both 
bargaining blocs insisted on their positions. After a lengthy internal struggle it became clear that there 
was little room for compromise and eventually bargaining broke down. Since then, the RSB has 
completed the rolling out of its certification scheme, but many stakeholders have effectively 
abandoned the initiative.  
It was in late 2007 when discussions in the RSB first turned toward the issue of governance. Until 
then, the RSB had been governed by the FSB, an ad hoc group of people who had volunteered at the 
initiative’s foundational meeting in November 2006. As the organization evolved and the standard-
setting process was launched, the members of the FSB began discussing the necessity of providing the 
RSB with a formal governance structure.  
“[T]he more we communicate, the more people who ask on whose behalf we are communicating, 
and request some clear governance structure” (RSB, 2007b: 8).  
The issue received further attention during subsequent board meetings. Whereas some felt that it was 
important to quickly formalize the RSB, others feared that “roundtables are very slow when they start 
with governance” (RSB, 2007b: 8). However, most FSB members agreed that a formal structure and 
procedures were needed and at a meeting in June 2008 a decision was made to move forward with the 
issue. To this end, a governance committee was formed and charged with developing a proposal for a 
formal governance structure. Participation in the governance committee was open to all members of 
the FSB, but those who volunteered were mostly people with previous experience of multi-stakeholder 
regulation. In fact, only one industry representative volunteered to serve on the committee (RSB, 
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2008b). In the following months, the committee conducted a survey among the members of the RSB 
WGs which was used to identify stakeholder categories and to develop a chamber system for the RSB 
(interview with members of the governance committee). In October 2008, the governance committee 
presented its proposal to the FSB which approved it unanimously (RSB, 2008c). In its final version, 
the governance committee’s proposal recommended the creation of eleven stakeholder chambers: six 
civil society chambers, four industry chambers, and one non-voting chamber for government agencies, 
IGOs, consultancy firms, academics, and certification agencies (see Figure 2). The composition of the 
newly created SB followed from the chamber structure. Each chamber elected up to two 
representatives, called co-chairs, who represented the chamber at the SB-level. 
In January 2009, the eleven chamber system came into effect and the RSB was launched as a 
formal membership organization. It was also during 2009 when the RSB membership base increased 
rapidly. In particular, feedstock growers and biofuel producers joined the initiative. They soon became 
the largest constituency groups, with Chamber 1 and 2 soon counting more than 30 members 
(interview with one of co-chairs of Chamber 2). These companies joined the RSB at a time in which 
the organization’s governance structure had already been formalized, putting civil society actors in a 
strong position (they controlled six out of the ten voting chambers). Worried about the level of NGO 
influence, and that the resulting standard would turn out to be too demanding and costly to implement, 
upstream industry actors began to challenge the institutional status quo in the RSB. In autumn 2009, 
Chamber 2 wrote a letter to the SB, requesting that the eleven chamber system be revised. Their 
position was that voting power in the RSB should more strongly reflect actual participation. In this 
regard, it was argued that many of the civil society chambers had only very few members and that they 
often failed to reach a quorum during their meetings. In an interview, one of the co-chairs of Chamber 
2 stated that “we did not think it was fair that a chamber with thirty members had the same vote, 
which is one vote, as a chamber with four members”. Not surprisingly, the group of civil society 
organizations strongly disagreed with the biofuel producers’ demand for more influence over the 
decision-making process. They pointed out that many NGOs are umbrella organizations, representing 
many members:  
 “[J]ust having more members isn’t a fair measure either, since a single organization may represent 
more stakeholders in the field than another entire chamber has members. For example this is the 
case for some member–based NGOs, representing several hundreds of villagers over broad 
geographic areas” (RSB, 2010f: 3). 
The conflict over governance dominated much of the internal debate in 2010 and at some point a 
decision was made to put the RSB’s other activities on hold until a solution was found (RSB, 2010f). 
During the often heated discussions at the SB-level, the group of biofuel producers threatened that “if 
the governance in the RSB is not changed to its satisfaction, some members of Chamber 2 will get 
out” (RSB, 2010f: 3). In fact, several members of Chamber 2, among them the European Biodiesel 
Board and the European Bioethanol Association, announced their resignation during this period and 
left the RSB (Biofuel Digest, 2010; European Biodiesel Board, 2010).  
In an attempt to overcome the crisis, a second governance committee was established. This time a 
careful balance was maintained between industry and civil society actors as well as organizations from 
the global north and south (RSB, 2010f). In its reform proposal, the committee recommenced reducing 
the number of stakeholder chambers from eleven to seven. The new structure would consist of three 
civil society chambers, three industry chambers, and the former Chamber 11 as a non-voting chamber. 
However, the seven chamber system also did not find support among the biofuel producers. Instead, 
they proposed to merge civil society Chamber 4 (land, water, human and labor rights NGOs, and trade 
unions) and 5 (rural development, food security, and community-based organizations), arguing that 
these chambers had very few members. Again, the group of NGOs opposed the idea. In a statement, 
the representatives of Chamber 4 and 5 criticized that they “see the proposal as a step backward for 
their constituencies returning to the ‘top-down’ approach, which denies the rights of small-scale and 
vulnerable stakeholders” (RSB, 2010d: 21).  
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At a meeting of the SB in November 2010, Chamber 2 made a last attempt to renegotiate the 
constitutional rules of the RSB. It proposed to merge all existing chambers into a unique private sector 
chamber, a unique civil society chamber, and a third non-voting chamber for government agencies, 
IGOs, consultancy firms, academics, and certification agencies. Furthermore, the proposal included a 
method for resolving deadlocks through a two-thirds majority vote of all voting members present 
(RSB, 2010e). But again, NGOs and many of the downstream industry actors in the RSB opposed the 
idea of a three chamber system. They argued that “reducing stakeholders to 3 total and only 2 voting 
chambers would impact the ‘roundtable’ spirit of the RSB by effectively making it a ‘triangle’ 
discussion, with a consequent polarization of discussions and members” (RSB, 2010d: 21). 
Furthermore, concerns were expressed that “the deadlock breaking method would turn RSB decision-
making into a numbers game – the group mustering the most members would win. That is contrary to 
the spirit of multi-stakeholder roundtables, where all voices are entitled to consideration regardless of 
their numbers” (RSB, 2010d: 21). Eventually, Chamber 2’s proposal was voted down at the SB-level 
and the seven chamber system was confirmed as the new structure of the RSB (RSB, 2010e).  
Unsuccessful in increasing their influence over the decision-making process, upstream industry 
actors in the RSB began to directly challenge the content and design of the RSB’s certification system. 
In November 2010, the standard-setting process was nearing completion and discussion in the RSB 
turned toward the rolling out of the certification system. In this context, a proposal was made to 
introduce a two-tiered certification scheme. The first tier should consist of a less comprehensive, 
entry-level version and the second tier of the full RSB standard. The rationale behind the two-tiered 
certification system was to increase the RSB’s competitiveness on the European biofuel certification 
market. At the time, other biofuel certification schemes were already operational and it was feared that 
the more demanding RSB standard would discourage firms from becoming RSB certified (RSB, 
2010e: 12).  
Over the following months, the discussion about the two-tiered certification system developed into 
a more general debate about the RSB and its standard. On one side of the debate, feedstock growers 
and biofuel producers were strongly in favor of the two-tiered certification system (interviews with 
members of Chamber 1 and 2). However, they opposed the idea of a mandatory transition mechanism 
which would have obliged them to transition to tier two – the full RSB standard – after a period of 
three years. It was argued that the full standard was too demanding and that there was no market 
demand for RSB certified products. In this regard, a representative of a large Argentinian farmers 
association stated during a chamber conference call that “if RSB asks farmers to commit to adoption 
of RSB full standard (Tier 2) after three years, then most farmers will not sign it” (RSB, 2010a: 2). 
Others argued that“[c]ivil society knew that by signing up, they would have to work with industry, and 
if they stick to ‘you must comply with the full RSB standard,’ participation will be nearly non-
existent. (…) There is no market in the world today for an RSB certified product. (…) It will not be 
possible to sell the RSB to industry players when there are other lower cost options (…)” (RSB, 
2010c: 3-4). Overall, the meeting minutes provide evidence for the confrontational nature of the 
discussions during this period: 
“It is less important to get consensus with other Chambers than to get the Standard right. There 
was a problem with representation of Chambers in the RSB all along” (RSB, 2010b: 3).  
On the other side of the debate, civil society actors were concerned that the two-tier certification 
system would effectively result in a watering down of the RSB standard. They also feared that the 
introduction of tier one would create reputational risks for the RSB and themselves (interview with 
NGO representatives). Against this background, strong reservations and criticism were expressed 
against both the two-tier certification system and industry’s opposition against a mandatory transition 
mechanism: 
“A few months ago there was no Tier 1, only people that wanted to join the RSB. It seems strange 
that we are going to revise our structure for a whole cadre of producers that were not even 
interested in joining the RSB system a few months ago. (…) If companies are not willing to come 
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on board to the full RSB system, even after 3 years, then perhaps RSB should not exist” (RSB, 
2010g: 3-4).  
Despite these concerns, civil society actors eventually agreed to the two-tier certification system under 
the condition that a set of “incurable” issues was included. In an interview, a member of the RSB 
Secretariat explained that an issue was considered incurable, if non-compliance with that issue was 
irreversible; for example, this is the case when forests are cleared or basic human rights are violated 
(interview with a member of the RSB Secretariat). Furthermore, civil society actors insisted that a 
transition to tier two had to be mandatory.  
The design and content of the two-tiered certification system remained at the center of discussions 
throughout 2011. A working group was established to define the details of the transition process and 
several chamber and SB meetings were held to further discuss and negotiate the issue. However, there 
was little room for compromise between the two groups. Civil society actors regarded most of the 
content of the full standard as incurable. In this regard, social rights NGOs insisted on the inclusion of 
human and labor rights and others regarded food security and sustainable livelihoods as indispensable 
(RSB, 2010d). As a result, the final proposal for the content of tier one still included eleven out of the 
twelve principles of the full RSB standard (RSB, 2011b: 5). This was not acceptable for the group of 
biofuel producers which continued to oppose a mandatory transition mechanism and any extra costs 
resulting from certification:  
“Chamber Two considers any economic disadvantage in the fuel market originating form 
sustainability certification as an incurable. Participating Operators should not be demanded to 
transition to Tier 2 if at the end of the transitional period there is no market demand for a product 
complying with all 12 P&C [Principles and Criteria]. Doing so would mean an added cost to 
producers which they will not be able to recover. This is considered by industrial producers as an 
incurable issue” (RSB, 2011a: 4). 
Eventually, bargaining broke down as no agreement seemed to be possible between the two groups. At 
a SB meeting in June 2011, a decision was made to not further pursue the issue. The meeting minutes 
read that “there is no real interest from potential users in a Tier One that imposes limited claims but is 
not significantly easier to comply with” (RSB, 2011c: 13). As a consequence, many industry actors 
have effectively abandoned the initiative as evidenced by the scheme’s low market uptake. Today, the 
European biofuel certification market is dominated by sustainability initiatives which are closely 
aligned with industry interests such as International Sustainability and Carbon Certification (ISCC), 
REDcert, and Biomass Biofuels Sustainability Voluntary Scheme (2BSvs), whereas the RSB is largely 
insignificant (Ponte, 2014; Schleifer, 2013). Asked about the decision to not become RSB certified, 
one member of Chamber 2 explained in an interview:  
“You know, the world moves on and we move on without you if you do not keep up with us. 
There is almost an industry of certifications schemes out there.”  
Exploring the Causes of ‘Deliberation Failure’  
The in-depth analysis of meeting minutes and interview material conducted above revealed that 
despite ideal institutional scope conditions bargaining, and not deliberation, was the dominant mode of 
stakeholder interaction in the RSB. What explains this outcome and what can we learn from it? In 
order to shed some light on these questions, this section uses induction to unravel the causes of 
deliberation failure in the biofuels arena. In this regard, the case study of the RSB points to the highly 
politicized nature of the biofuels debate as well as the wider regulatory context as the main 
contributing factors.  
With regard to the former, it was found that the biofuels arena in particular is characterized by 
deep-seated divisions and ideologically charged conflicts, leaving little room for arguing and 
compromise. In this regard, the launch of the RSB coincided with the onset of the global food crisis in 
2007/2008. During the crisis, biofuels were widely blamed as a key driver behind the price hikes of 
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agricultural commodities and food shortages in the global south occurring in this period. In the 
ensuing debate over the sustainability of biofuels, the different parties often took extreme positions. 
One example is the then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who went as far as 
calling them a “crime against humanity” (The Guardian, 2008). Also, many NGOs started 
campaigning against biofuels, which they argued to be an inherently unsustainable technology 
(Biofuelwatch, 2007; Friends of the Earth Europe, 2008; Oxfam International, 2008). On the other side 
of the debate, biofuel producers in the global south and elsewhere were deeply concerned about their 
investments and that anti-biofuels protests and strict sustainability regulation in the global north could 
put their industry and businesses at risk. Although consisting of a coalition of more moderate NGOs 
and progressive firms, these conflicts and struggles in the wider biofuels arena translated into tensions 
and frictions in the RSB. In the end, the highly politicized nature of the biofuels debate made 
deliberative reflections about preferences and normative beliefs very difficult, and in many situations 
bargaining over influence and regulatory outcomes became the dominant mode of stakeholder 
interaction. 
Secondly, the wider regulatory context in which the RSB is embedded has contributed to 
undermining its deliberative approach. In order to mitigate the social and environmental impact of its 
biofuel policy, the EU included a mandatory sustainability scheme in the EU RED. This scheme 
stipulates that, in order to count against the overall target of 10 percent of renewable energy in the 
transport sector, biofuels in the EU are required to comply with a set of environmental sustainability 
criteria. For example, one criterion requires a minimum level of 35 percent savings in GHG emissions 
when compared to fossil fuels. Another criterion mandates that biofuels cannot be obtained from land 
that was categorized in January 2008 as having a high biodiversity value. In the same way, biomass 
obtained from land with high carbon stock cannot be used for biofuel production (European Union, 
2009). However, no public implementation mechanism was created. Instead, the EU Commission 
relies on private certification schemes like the RSB to monitor and “enforce” compliance. To this end, 
an accreditation procedure was created, making it possible for private standard systems to apply for 
formal EU recognition and to act as certifiers under the EU RED. But undermining the good 
governance approach of the RSB the EU set a very low baseline for recognition – for example, making 
no requirements for stakeholder inclusion and making no references to social standards. In the first 
application cycle, seven private schemes were granted the status as qualifying standards, among them 
several initiatives closely aligned with industry interests (EU Commission, 2011). Legitimized by 
formal EU recognition, schemes like the above-mentioned ISCC, REDcert, and 2BSvs constituted 
attractive alternatives for companies operating in the European biofuel market. Choosing these 
schemes over the RSB allowed them to claim sustainability for their products without having to 
engage in difficult interactions with critical NGOs.
2
  
In sum, these findings caution against too much enthusiasm about the participatory paradigm in 
global sustainability politics. For the area of private biofuel governance, this paper showed that the 
practice of “roundtabling” sustainable development (Ponte, 2014) seems to underestimate the huge 
political differences and conflicts that exist in this arena. While deliberation is not a fair-weather mode 
of governance, the highly politicized nature of the biofuels debate made it extremely difficult for firms 
and civil society actors to leave their entrenched positions and to engage in a more open-minded and 
consensus-oriented discussion about sustainability. Against this background, it could be hypothesized 
that political environments differ in their opportunity structure for deliberative behavior, and that there 
was little room for consensus-oriented arguing in the biofuels arena. Also, the case at hand shows that 
new modes of governance cannot be analyzed independent from the wider institutional context in 
which these systems operate. Whereas the institutional scope conditions provided by the RSB can be 
considered ideal, the scheme’s deliberative capacity was undermined through public policies which 
                                                     
2
 See Schleifer (2013) for a detailed a nalysis of the interaction of public and private sustainability governance in this 
policy area.  
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reduced the pressure on business actors to engage with the more inclusive and transparent approach of 
the biofuels roundtable.  
Conclusions  
This article studied the contested nature of deliberative sustainability governance two decades after the 
participatory paradigm was announced at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro. With a focus on private governance at the transnational level, it 
provided an in-depth analysis of business-civil society interaction in the RSB, a multi-stakeholder 
scheme created to define an internationally accepted standard for sustainable biofuel production. 
Through its highly inclusive and transparent design, the RSB provides what could be called ideal 
institutional scope conditions for meaningful deliberative governance to occur.  
However, falling far short of the deliberative ideal of open-minded and consensus-oriented arguing, 
stakeholder interaction in the RSB was often characterized by strategic bargaining over influence and 
regulatory outcomes. To illustrate this point, two episodes from the recent history of the RSB were 
described. The first episode showed how business actors challenged the institutional status quo in the 
RSB, demanding more influence over the decision-making process. These power struggles paralyzed 
the organization over an extended period of time, and several producer members left the RSB as a 
result. The second episode documented how the rolling out of the certification system developed into a 
prolonged episode of institutional bargaining about the objectives and purpose of the biofuels 
roundtable. At the heart of this debate, were industry demands for a ratcheted-down version of the 
RSB production standard, which civil society actors vehemently opposed. Eventually, bargaining 
broke down as no zone of possible agreement could be identified. Today, many business actors have 
effectively abandoned the RSB as a forum for defining sustainable standards and – outcompeted by 
industry-dominated initiatives like the ISCC, REDcert, and 2BSvs – the scheme plays only a marginal 
role in the global biofuels certification market.  
Through an inductive analysis of meeting minutes, interviews, and other materials, the high level of 
politicization as well as the background role of the state could be identified as the main causes of this 
deliberation failure. Shaken by the global food crisis and highly contentious topics like indirect land 
use change, the biofuels arena provided few opportunities for meaningful deliberative governance. As 
a result, stakeholder interaction in the RSB frequently collapsed into episodes of intergroup 
bargaining. Furthermore undermining the deliberative approach of the RSB, state actors in the biofuel 
arena endorsed a non-participatory model of private sustainability governance. This reduced the 
pressure on biofuel producers to engage with critical NGOs and many sought certification with 
schemes closely aligned with industry interests. Against this background, this paper concludes on a 
cautionary note, pointing to the many difficulties of organizing meaningful deliberation for sustainable 
development.  
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Annex: List of Interviews 
 
 
Organisation Type Date 
Amigos da Terra Phone interview 16.12.2011 
Biojet Corp Phone interview 09.11.2011 
BP In-person interview 07.12.2011 
Cosmo Biofuels Phone interview  20.12.2011 
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne In-person interview 18.11.2011 
Forest Stewardship Council International Phone interview 23.11.2011 
Friends of the Earth Europe Phone interview 05.12.2011 
International Air Transport Association  Phone interview 02.12.2011 
International Union for Conservation of 
Nature 
Phone interview 29.11.2011 
National Wildlife Federation Phone interview 14.11.2011 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels 
(two interviews)  
In-person interview 
Phone interview 
18.11.2011 
01.12.2011 
Swiss Energy Ministry Phone interview 01.11.2011 
UN Foundation Phone interview 02.12.2011 
United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development  
Phone interview 31.10.2011 
World Economic Forum In-person interview 07.12.2011 
World Wildlife Fund for Nature International  
(two Interviews) 
Phone interview 
Phone interview 
21.10.2011 
28.11.2011 
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